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In a vertically differentiated oligopoly, firms raise cost−reducing alliances before competing
with each other. It is shown that heterogeneity in quality and in cost functions reduces
individual incentives to form links. Furthermore, both differentiated Cournot and Bertrand
competition create qualitatively similar incitations to form alliances.
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A recent literature in industrial economics puts ahead strategic incentives for rival ﬁrms
form R&D alliances. Yet, this literature misses to analyze the impact of ﬁrm heterogeneity
on incentives to form links. To ﬁll this lack is the aim of this note. We consider a vertically
(and horizontally) diﬀerentiated oligopoly, in which ﬁrms form collaborative links before
competition (Cournot and Bertrand) in order to reduce their production costs. In this
context, we explore the role of heterogeneity in both marginal cost functions and qualities
inside the industry on building-up of stable networks.
We ﬁrst argue that these heterogeneities reduce individual incentives to link formation:
two ﬁrms are incited to form a cost-reducing alliance if they are close enough with regard
to some individual parameter, explicitly the quality index multiplied by the variation of
marginal cost inherent to the formation of one link. Hence, an increase in the variance
of this parameter induces less connected stable networks. Precisely, stable networks are
locally complete with respect to the parameter mentioned just above. This means that,
when ranking ﬁrms by increasing value of this parameter, whenever two ﬁrms both gain
to form a link, this is also the case for any pair of ﬁrms ranked between them. The distri-
bution of this parameter thus determines the network density. Secondly, we observe that
diﬀerentiated Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly provide similar incentives of link formation.
However, our study has several deﬁciencies. Firstly, our paper lacks a full analysis for large
cost of link formation. Nevertheless, it is shown that under large costs of link formation,
quality index and marginal cost function do not play a symmetric role in the shaping of
stable networks, so that locally completeness vanishes. Secondly, we are unable to provide
a satisfying social welfare analysis.
This note is related to the literature on the formation of R&D associations and is
inspired by Bloch (1995) and Goyal and Joshi (2003). In both approaches ﬁrms form
associations prior to competition in order to reduce their marginal costs. In the former
they form coalition, in the latter they form bilateral agreements. With regard to Goyal and
Joshi notably, we extend their benchmark case of homogenous oligopoly to diﬀerentiated
(in product) oligopoly with heterogenous ﬁrms (in qualities and marginal costs). Our
main related contribution is to see that only ﬁrms producing closely related products or
facing similar production costs will form a collaborative link; hence, our context exhibits
the possible emergence of stable networks containing incomplete components. The reason
why is that heterogeneity implies asymmetric gains from link formation, in such a way
that the hypothesis (SY1) presented by the authors does not hold (the condition states
that two symmetric ﬁrms have always an incentive to form a link). Let us also note that
the stable architecture described here is formally equivalent to the networks exhibited by
1Johnson and Gilles (2000) in a context where agents are not rival.
The note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the speciﬁc archi-
tectures emphasized in further results. Section 3 is devoted to Cournot and section 4 to
Bertrand competition.
2 The model
We consider an industry with N ≥ 2 ﬁrms, each producing a diﬀerentiated good. Each
product i is described by a quality index ui. We denote by xi the quantity of product i sold
to each user. There are S identical consumers. Following Sutton (1997) and Symeonidis
(2003), the utility function of each consumer is given by the following quality-augmented



















where M = Y −
P
i pixi denotes expenditures on outside goods, and the parameter σ
(∈ [0,2] for Cournot competition and ∈ [0,2[ for Bertrand competition) is an inverse
measure of the degree of horizontal product diﬀerentiation. from this utility function we
derive the following individual inverse demand function for variety i:











(in the region where prices and quantities are positive)




(2 + σ(N − 2))ui(1 − pi) − σ
P
j6=i uj(1 − pj)
(2 − σ)(2 + σ(N − 1))
We suppose that ﬁrms can engage collaboration links prior to market competition, in order
to decrease their marginal cost. We represent by a non directed graph the structure of
links between the ﬁrms. A graph g is a pair (N,L) where N is a set of ﬁrms and L is
a set of pairs of ﬁrms in N. We denote by G the set of all non directed graphs with N
nodes. We shall abuse the notation by writing that some link ij ∈ g, which means that
a link exists between the two agents in the graph g. Symbol g − ij (resp. g + ij denotes
the graph g less (resp. augmented by) the link ij. A path in the graph g is a sequence of
nodes {a0ap} such that aiai+1 ∈ g for all i ∈ {0,...,p−1}. A component of a graph g is a
subgraph such that there is a path between any pair of agent in the component, and there
is no link between any agent inside the component and any agent outside the component.
Given a network g, we denote by πi(g) the proﬁt made by ﬁrm i in this network.
2The marginal cost of a ﬁrm in a network is decreasing with regard to the number of
collaborative ties the ﬁrm is involved in. Linearity of marginal cost functions is crucial
for uniqueness. We say that marginal costs are ﬁrm-speciﬁc linear when marginal cost
functions are linear and cost variations (w.r.t. the creation of a new link) are heterogenous.
Hence,
∀i ∈ N,∀g ∈ G,ci = c0 + ∆i · ηi(g), ∆i < 0
We use the usual pairwise stability as deﬁned in Goyal and Joshi (2003). A stable network
g satisﬁes two conditions:
(i) for ij ∈ g, πi(g) > πi(g − ij) and πj(g) > πj(g − ij)
(ii) for ij / ∈ g, if πi(g + ij) > πi(g), then πj(g + ij) ≤ πj(g)
Finally, we identify the network structures emphasized in this note. The empty network
is such that no pair of nodes forms a link. The complete network is the graph such that
all pairs of nodes form a link. A complete component is a component such that all pairs
of nodes in the component form a link.
A τ-vicinity network is built as follows. Suppose that each node i is associated with a
positive real number r(i). Consider a nonnegative real number τ. Then build the network






> τ. Hence, if τ > 1, the network is
the empty graph. If τ = 0, the network is the complete graph. Between these two extreme
situations, that is for τ ∈]0,1], all networks can be generated according to the distribution
of numbers. The network structure described here is locally complete, as deﬁned in Johnson
and Gilles (2000). That is, labelling without loss the ﬁrms by increasing number of index
r(i), if ﬁrms i and j form a link, with say i < j, then the link kl is formed whatever k,l
such that i ≤ k < l ≤ j.
3 Cournot competition
The following proposition applies:
Proposition 3.1 In this diﬀerentiated oligopoly ` a la Cournot with ﬁrm-speciﬁc linear
marginal costs, there is a unique stable network. Particularly, two ﬁrms i and j form a










with ξC = σ
4+σ(N−2) ∈]0,1[. Hence, the unique stable network is the ξC-vicinity network
with r(i) = ui · |∆i|.
3Proof. Given the shape of the inverse demand function, standard derivations implicate









k=1 uk(ck(ηk(g)) − 1)
(4 − σ)(4 + σ(N − 1))
Let us consider a graph g and agents i and j such that ij / ∈ g. We compute the net beneﬁt
for agent i from forming a link with agent j. Straightforward calculation entails (Symbol
v means proportional to):
























cj(ηj(g)) − cj(ηj(g) + 1)
 >
σ
4 + σ(N − 2)





4 + σ(N − 2)
which is independent of the network structure. This ensures existence and uniqueness of
the stable networks. Q.E.D.
Remarks:
1. Since ξC ∈]0,1[, the complete network is not uniquely stable in general. and hetero-
geneity may lead to the emergence of stable incomplete components.
2. When integrating large costs of link formation, a major diﬀerence is that quality index
and marginal cost functions do not play a symmetric role when integrating costs of link
formation. Let us examine the homogenous case (σ = 2). Denoting by f > 0 the cost
of link formation, straightforward computation indicates that the link ij is proﬁtable to












> (N + 1)f
with Γij = Nui|∆i| − uj|∆j|. If f = 0, the sole condition Γij > 0 is suﬃcient, and when
ordering agents by increasing value of parameter u|∆|, if ui|∆i| ≤ uk|∆k| < ul|∆l| ≤
uj|∆j|, then Γij > 0 implies Γkl > 0, which induces the emergence of locally complete
networks. If f > 0, the above condition includes individual characteristics that can impede
locally completeness.
43. The positivity of equilibrium quantities write for each ﬁrm i:
ui(1 − ci(ηi(g)))
P
j6=i uj(1 − cj(ηj(g)))
≥
σ
4 + σ(N − 2)
We note that p∗
i > 0 if and only if y∗
i >
−ci(ηi)ui
2 . Then, if the equilibrium quantity is
positive, the equilibrium price is also positive. Note ﬁrst that when σ = 0, the condition
is automatically satisﬁed. Basically, the more diﬀerentiated the products, the less con-
straining the condition of positivity. Second, when σ > 0, the positivity of equilibrium
quantities does not imply the condition of proﬁtability of link formation, nor the converse.
The worst situation with respect to incentive of link formation is attained for σ = 2. In
this case, the right hand side of the above equation equals 1
N−1; hence a N-ﬁrms network
is viable iﬀ for all pair of ﬁrms (i,j), ui(1 − ci(ηi(g))) = uj(1 − cj(ηj(g))). For instance,
when ﬁrms are homogenous and σ = 2, then the positivity is true if and only if the graph
is symmetric, i.e. such that all ﬁrms have the same number of partners.
4 Bertrand competition
Bertrand competition entails the same stable network structures.
Proposition 4.1 In this diﬀerentiated oligopoly ` a la Bertrand with ﬁrm-speciﬁc linear
marginal costs, there is a unique stable network. Particularly, two ﬁrms i and j form a











Hence, the unique stable network is the ξ-vicinity network with r(i) = ui · |∆i|.







(2 + σ(N − 2))ui(1 − pi) − σ
P
j6=i uj(1 − pj)

(2 − σ)(2 + σ(N − 1))
Standard derivations enable to determine the price equilibrium:
p∗
i(g) · ui(4 + σ(2N − 3))(4 + σ(N − 3)) = (4 + σ(N − 3))(2 + σ(N − 1))ui
−σ(2 + σ(N − 2))
PN
k=1 uk
+(2 + σ(N − 2))





Thus, for graph g and link ij / ∈ g, and noting that πi v (pi − ci)2:
π∗
















ci(ηi(g) + 1) − ci(ηi(g))

Considering ﬁrm-speciﬁc linear marginal costs, the result on uniqueness follows. To ﬁnish,
a little calculus indicates that ξB > 0 as soon as N > 0. Indeed, the denominator is a
polynomial expression of order 2 in N. When σ > 2
5, there is no value of N that makes
the expression null (then it is always positive). When σ ≤ 2
5, the polynomial is negative




1. Bertrand competition creates less incentive to link formation than Cournot competition
since ξB > ξC for all N > 0.
2. Under ﬁrms heterogeneity, the condition (SY 1) as expressed in Yi (1998) or Goyal and
Joshi (2003) is not valid.
3. Goyal and Joshi (2003) show that Cournot competition entails drastically diﬀerent
incentives of link formation than Bertrand competition. Our study suggests that ﬁrms
heterogeneity may qualify these diﬀerences in the context of diﬀerentiated goods.
4. The positivity conditions write for each agent i:
ui(1 − ci(ηi(g)))
P
j6=i uj(1 − cj(ηj(g)))
≥
σ(2 + σ(N − 2))
(4 + σ(N − 3))(2 + σ(N − 1)) − σ(2 + σ(N − 2))
A similar discussion than that of the Cournot case applies. We note that when σ tends to
2 the value of the right hand side of the above equation tends to 2
2N−3, which is less than
1
N−1. This means that the system is not viable for nearly homogenous Bertrand oligopoly
(there exists at least one agent such that the condition does not hold). Hence, ‘almost’
homogenous Bertrand oligopoly is incompatible with bilateral agreements.
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